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ABSTRACT
Traditional cosmology, once used to explain the world, was suppressed by the domination of 
science over philosophy which happened after their separation. Nowadays, scientifi c (in terms 
of natural sciences) cosmology is given the advantage in answering the question what is the 
world, while the "non-empirical" catholicity (the basic characteristic of traditional cosmol-
ogy) became useless. Encouragement of one’s eff ort to re-establish the category of catholicity 
can be found in the idea of integrative bioethics on one side and in the philosophy of the 
world on the other. In this paper the relation between the idea of integrative bioethics and 
the philosophy of the world will be established through philosophical discussions which were 
held in Augsburg and in Zagreb (1988, 1990, 1993) and also with reliance on understanding 
the world in philosophy of Karl Löwith. 
Key words: Philosophy of the world, Karl Löwith, integrative bioethics, philosophy of his-
tory
Introduction. Th e notion of the world and the philosophy of the 
world
"We speak about the world in philosophy, as in common discourse, in many diff er-
ent ways, implying under that notion variety of things. It is customary to use ex-
pressions such as objective world and subjective world, interior world and exterior 
world, mental world and the world of objects, macro-world and micro-world, living 
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world and the world of artifi cial nature, realistic world and the world of fantasy, the 
world of art and the world of science, the world of good and the world of evil, old 
world and new world, developed world and poor world, existing world and possible 
world, etc. If we also say that we all live in the same world or that every one of us 
has his own world, we can see that the boundaries of the notion of the world are 
elastic. Once it can be a whole Kosmos but, on the other hand, looking in the frame-
work of these astronomic dimensions, man-particle has his own inner world. By all 
that something that should be the solid groundwork of our existence (based on 
which we should be able to defi ne our place in the world) is being distributed on 
numerous signifi cations and avoiding unique meaning."1
As in the Greek comprehension, the question about the Kosmos was suppressed by 
the question about the Being, accordingly, by further ontologisation, the notion of 
the world became subordinated to the notion of the Being. Th erefore, the crucial 
idea of the philosophy of the world is to reverse this relation by understanding the 
world as a necessary groundwork on which epistemological relation can be estab-
lished. Cognition is not done by penetration (penetration of a subject into the ob-
ject or vice versa), it is done by construction, equally it is not revealing of ‘it is’ by 
which only reduced notion of the world can be expressed. With this, the impossibil-
ity of metaphysics and ontology to comprehend the notion of the world2 in its com-
prehensive character is expressed and philosophy of the world is constructed to cor-
rect hierarchical inversion in which the notion of the world came with the notion of 
the Being.3 Th erefore, the Augsburg-Zagreb discussions (1988, 1990, and 1993) 
took the notion of the world in the centre of philosophical thinking. Th e compre-
hension of the notion of the world in Augsburg-Zagreb discussions was reasoned in 
German idealism, but also within contemporary philosophy. Although, as above 
mentioned quotation states, it is very hard, or almost impossible, to defi ne the no-
tion of the world and accordingly to establish any kind of division that is covering 
all spectrum of meanings, in this paper two comprehensions of the notion of the 
1 Zdravko Radman: "Simboli i svjetovi. O nekim aspektima fi lozofi je E. Cassirera i N. Goodmana", Filozofska 
istraživanja 20 (1/1987), p.155-166. (translation M. S.)
2 Milan Kangrga in his philosophy also denies the possibility of metaphysics to comprehend the notion of the 
world. Th e reasoning of the world as something that is given and therefore cannot be changed, understanding 
of the world as a solid object that is independent of subject in active (creative) sense, and only dependent in 
theoretical (penetrating) sense Kangrga is equalising with metaphysical (ontological, which is the same for Kangrga) 
understanding of the world as something that is given and which fi nds its accomplishment in science: "Metaphysics 
is here (as the one that is non-historical) being presented as a positivism and a historical confrontation between 
positivism and metaphysics is only an illusion and epochal confusion. Th e only thing that is happening here is 
consequent fi nalisation of important presumptions of metaphysics done by positivism and particular sciences. 
Th erefore science itself is just a fi nalisation of metaphysics." (Milan Kangrga, Čovjek i svijet: povijesni svijet i njegova 
mogućnost, Razlog, Zagreb 1975, p. 26. (translation M. S.)
3 Ante Čović: " Uz temu", Filozofska istraživanja 20 (1/1987), p. 3.
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world are of exceptional importance. First is the anthropocentric understanding of 
the notion of the world and second is cosmological understanding of the notion of 
the world. 
Anthropocentric and cosmological understanding of the notion 
of the world
Zdravko Radman in his paper Symbols and Worlds. About some aspects of philosophy of 
Ernst Cassirer and Nelson Goodman4, which is one of proceedings of Augsburg-Za-
greb discussions, explains when the notion of the world started to be understood in 
philosophy as man’s creation. When traditional philosophy asked the question what 
the world is, it perceived the world by itself and its essence independent of condi-
tions and possibilities by which it exists for us. Not before the appearance of Kant 
this neutral and indiff erent world vanishes and basic becomes the question of how is 
the cognition of the world possible. In the framework of this question the well 
known turn will happen: the appearance of the world becomes dependent on the 
conscious, or, as Kant stated, objects must adjust to the capacity of our cognition. 
By that the cognitive subject was given the creative role by which the reality became 
dependent on subject’s creative potential.5 
"Th e world that is being discussed here is overcoming the experience of senses, and 
also the boundaries of environment. World characterised as human is becoming real 
only when transcendence of what is directly present is done. Th at is done not by in-
teraction with the fragments of nature with which the world is coming into touch. 
It is done by coming into touch with symbolic forms which have made this tran-
scendence possible. Th at kind of world is a product of our creative practice which is 
realised in symbolical languages and represents the result of cognitive eff ort of these 
actions." 6
No matter whether we are talking about the notion of the world in relation with art, 
symbol or technique, practice or production as human essence, or, as another exam-
ple, self-consciousness as a scientifi c fundament:
"According to philosophical beliefs of Th e Modern Age the fact that the existence of 
self-consciousness is obvious must represent absolute fundament of knowledge, a 
4 Zdravko Radman: "Simboli i svjetovi. O nekim aspektima fi lozofi je E. Cassirera i N. Goodmana", Filozofska 
istraživanja 20 (1/1987).
5 For further research see ibid. p.155-166.
6 Zdravko Radman: "’Korijenske metafore’ i spoznaja svijeta", Filozofska istraživanja 38-39 (5-6/1990), p. 
1382. (translation M. S.)
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critical instance, constitutive substrate on which all sciences must be built or meas-
ure their results." 7, we are discoursing the world which, after Kant, is by human.8 
Th at kind of understanding of the notion of the world will be defi ned as anthropo-
centric. On the other hand, we have cosmological understanding of the notion of 
the world. 
"Th e world is eternal possibility and actuality. It is actualising its eternal possibility 
in determinative possibility of actuality... Th e world is in its beginning unchanged 
and unchangeable. Th e only thing that is being changed is worlds as historical reali-
sations of this original experience of the world in its beginning of its possibility. 
Which of this world has been or will be close to this actual world depends on how 
much did one of these worlds overcome the idea of itself, its inner fi xation." 9
Every philosophical cosmology, doctrine about the world, relies on the basis of one 
defi nition of the world in a sense of some coherence of totality of the being, hierar-
chically articulated according to the order of a range of the Being.10 
"Opposed to individual frames-notions which are being accomplished in the frame-
work of physiological mechanisms, the image (or the notion) of the world is tran-
scending physiological mechanisms and is being represented as a kind of an over-
shape which is being formatted on a level of totality of life experience. Having in 
mind that the totality of life experience has a universal character of transcendental 
value – it is avoiding time-space quantifi cation. Th at means that neither the notion 
of totality of life experience, nor the notion of the world are forms, although they 
are subordinated to the laws of forming. Th ey are over-forms, in a sense that they 
are making possible and comprehend every concrete forming." 11
Interesting example of understanding the notion of the world as Kosmos is Eugen 
Fink’s comprehension of the world as Cosmo-ontology. For him the world is the 
place of all places, time of all times and if the Being would originally be the world, it 
would not be in its substance joint but un-joint. Also, as Fink emphasises, the no-
tion of the world has the primacy over the notion of the Being because it is, as a part 
of a concrete life, directly present. In this, as he calls it, confrontation of the world, 
7 Darko Polšek, "’Diskonekcija svijeta’ – nužni korak fenomenološkog zasnivanja ontologije?", Filozofska 
istraživanja 20 (1/1987), p. 23. (translation M. S.)
8 Milan Kangrga in his philosophy also comprehends historical understanding of the world and is concluding 
that the world is a modern notion that has its historical origin in the French revolution and his philosophical origin 
in Kant’s Critique of pure reason.
9 Željko Pavić: "Povijesnost i izvanpovijesnost svijeta", Filozofska istraživanja 20 (1/1987), p. 50.
10 For further research see: Damir Barbarić: "Igra svijeta. Uz Finkov pokušaj novog određenja pojma svijeta", 
Filozofska istraživanja 38-39 (5-6/1990), p. 1303.
11 Josip Užarević: "Svijet i oblik", Filozofska istraživanja 20 (1/1987), p. 120. (translation M. S.)
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human, which is positioned between the sky and the ground is a co-fi ghter, co-
player, he is the mediator, he is ens cosmologicum. In original experience of the world 
implicitly lies the new interpretation of the Being where the substance of the Being 
fi nds its place and time in the circulation of the world.
Karl Löwith and philosophy of the world
Th is cosmological comprehension of the notion of the world can also fi nd reliance 
in philosophy of Karl Löwith12. Löwith sees history as a history of men’s falling into 
anthropocentrism:
"It is obvious that Löwith was disturbed by the philosophy of history, eschatology, 
historical conciseness which penetrated into the core of scientifi c (in terms of natu-
ral sciences) reasoning."13
What he claims for is the return of ancient Greek understanding of the origin. He sees 
history as oblivion of nature in ancient understanding of physis. He understands the 
world opposed to anthropocentric orientation of philosophy, the one which represents 
the apology of subject, subjectiveness, which ends in western rationalism in a defi ni-
tion of a man as a being with reason. What he opposes to this understanding of the 
world is the idea that there always has been and will be one world for a man and that 
is the world of nature, ever existing catholic world in which man by nature lives and 
dies.
"Löwith is trying to persuade us that man is above all homo naturalis, he is nature, 
he has it as a man and his nature is therefore human from the beginning. It is logical 
to say that this idea has certain truth inside itself which is starting to be of a provi-
dential importance in the time when we are questioning ourselves about the condi-
tions and possibilities of one new, ecological civilisation, whose principles are ex-
pressed in a multitude of individual motives and diff erences precisely by Karl 
Löwith."14
In order to explain and therefore to reveal or, it is maybe better to say, to criticise con-
temporary scientifi c (in terms of natural sciences) reasoning, Karl Löwith questions 
philosophy of history and takes the notion of the world as a central issue of his phi-
12 Karl Löwith (January 9, 1897 – May 26, 1973) was a German philosopher and a student of Heidegger. His 
best known works include two books: From Hegel to Nietzsche, which describes the decline of German classical 
philosophy, and Meaning in History, which discusses the problematic relationship between theology and history.
13 Karl Löwith, Svjetska povijest i događanje spasa, August Cesarec Zagreb/ Svjetlost, Sarajevo 1990, p. 15.
14 Karl Löwith, Svjetska povijest i događanje spasa, August Cesarec, Zagreb/ Svjetlost, Sarajevo 1990, p. 21.
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losophy.15 According to Löwith, world can be comprehended only in relation with 
God and man, while the world history is just a manifestation of changes in that rela-
tion. Karl Löwith divides stages in world history on theism, deism and atheism.16 In 
the God-world-man trinity hierarchy is not propound, but the world history appears 
as result of hierarchical changes in that relation. First stage of the world history is an-
cient world of Greek cosmotheology, where God is in the world, meaning he cannot be 
separated from the world. God and world are the one, while the man himself is subor-
dinated to the world and therefore God. In the second, anthropotheological stage, God 
is personalised and placed above the world, while the world is redundant and seen as 
an obstacle in men-God relationship, so it could be said that the world is now subor-
dinated to God and man. In the third, anthropocosmological17 stage, God is pushed out 
of the God-world-man trinity, argues Löwith. Although this is a stage of atheism, tak-
ing into consideration the rise of man’s power of creation (i.e. penetrating and being 
able to change the nature of all living beings including himself ), God is now inside a 
man. Th is is not in the harmonic sense as God pervaded all world in the anthropothe-
ological stage, but in a sense that man deems himself God:
"Ancient times believed in prophecy, the Church believed in predestination while the 
modern man, unless he is superstitious, believes neither in destiny nor in providence. 
He believes he can create the future himself. From great conceptions of ancient times 
and Christianity – cyclical moving and eschatological accomplishment – we are now 
coming to the turning point in the history of the world in which man appears on the 
horizon as soon the only creator of himself and therefore the future. "18
It can be seen that Karl Löwith’s epochs were framed in a sense of a history of obliv-
ion, estrangement form primordial history, from Greek-Roman notion of Kosmos 
and nature. History of nature and physical world have only been metaphorically 
spoken about. Th ey have been included in one philosophy of the world history, in a 
15 What Löwith sees as doubtful are dramatic divisions of the world of nature and the world of spirit (history). 
Although it could look as the world of history is the only world, more powerful and more meaningful than the 
world of nature, which is by itself absolutely self-relevant (od quod substat), the one that moves from itself, we 
are staying a part of nature even when we are changing it into the dangerous artifi cial world through science and 
technology. (Ibid., p. 11-12.) (translation M. S.)
16 For further research see: Karl Löwith: Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Methaphysik von Decartes bis zu Nietzsche, 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1967.
17 "Anthropological attribute which philosophy is accepting in the third stage should not be related to the 
philosophical anthropology or seen as its predominance. What is being demonstrated here is the foundation 
of the whole philosophy of human who is establishing his world and is becoming its subject, in a Heidegger’s 
understanding of the Modern Age metaphysics as ‘ontology of subject’. But to accomplish symmetry in denoting 
and linguistic equivalence term anthropocosmology will be used for the third stage. By doing that, the logic of 
Löwith’s thought will be followed." (Ante Čović: "Aporije Löwithova povratka ‘prirodnom svijetu’", Filozofska 
istraživanja 51 (4/1993), p. 955-965.) (translation M. S.)
18 Karl Löwith, Svjetska povijest i događanje spasa, August Cesarec, Zagreb/ Svjetlost, Sarajevo 1990, p. 36.
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perspective of one eschatology – history of salvation. What happens in that case is 
something that is fateful for all history and also for the present. Th at is ignoring and 
unexponentiation of the world of nature, its mystery and order, the world which is 
not man’s act and artifi cial creation.19
In the contemporary anthropotheological stage, scientifi c (in terms of natural scienc-
es) understanding and consequentially exploitation of the world is dominating. Th e 
reason for that lies in the fact that the world is perceived as man’s creation, some-
thing that can and should be empirically explained. On the other hand, cosmologi-
cal understanding of the notion of the world can be seen as encouragement to con-
template the world otherwise:
"By placing analogy with Greek or Roman cosmology we are just pointing out one 
philosophical/historical benchmark which never got real chance."20
Bioethics and philosophy of the world
Th is cosmological understanding of the world for which we can fi nd incentive in 
philosophy of the world on one hand and which is being used in the philosophy of 
Karl Löwith as an alternative to anthropocentric reasoning of the world, also shares 
some similarities with contemporary ‘movement’ of integrative bioethics.
To explain this statement furthermore, it is essential to see when bioethics appears. 
Bioethics rises in the climax of contemporary anthropocosmological stage and precise-
ly in men’s encounter with himself in the fi eld of medicine21. Gradually bioethical 
horizon has been widened, from medical ethics and principalism to ethical plural-
ism and interdisciplinary approach. Finally, bioethics extends its framework to the 
notion of a life as a whole with corresponding pluriperspectivism and integrative 
approach.22
Both, integrative approach and cosmological understanding of the notion of the world 
can be seen as an alternative to anthropocentric tradition of modern philosophy, 
meaning that human is here comprehended and positioned only in co-existence. As a 
19 Ibid., p. 13-14.
20 Ibid., p. 15.
21 Here it is referred to Seattle case in 1962 where it was realised that man cannot be simply seen as a scientifi c 
fact or mathematically as a count of defi ned parts – meaning that scientists were not able to decide who shall live 
and who should die, therefore we could say that the catholicism of a man was awoken.




result of integrative approach we can see the rise of bioethical sensibility23 in a concern 
for non-human living beings and responsibility for maintenance of all conditions of 
preserving life in general. Also, methodologically speaking, in ancient thinking mesh 
of the man, world and God was implied, and in contemporary scientifi c rationality we 
still cannot fi nd an obverse to it. But we can see modern refl ection of ancient non-di-
vided rationality in pluriperspective approach of integrative bioethics. Since integra-
tive reasoning24 was developed as a resistance to hierarchy of truth and knowledge and 
as a resistance to exclusiveness of scientifi c understanding of the world, it can be said 
that, with its pluriperspective approach which includes non-scientifi c views on con-
temporary problems, it also assimilates catholic character. 
While in the framework of philosophy of the world we start from the notion of the 
world and by deduction come to the man as its integral part, in the framework of 
bioethics, which through integrative understanding widens its horizon from man 
(medical ethics), from bios to Kosmos, by induction we come to the notion of the 
world. Remembering that the aim of integrative bioethics approach is to give a spe-
cifi c kind of knowledge which is supposed to provide orientation in the world, it 
can be said that integrative bioethics also takes the notion of the world as a central 
notion in its reasoning and with broadening its activity on life as a whole catholi-
cism as its basic quality. Th erefore, we can say that bioethics enforced itself as a 
‘natural’ response to the philosophy of the world. If we see history as a history of 
man’s falling into anthropocentrism (K. Löwith) and take into consideration the ap-
pearance of bioethics as an attempt of overstepping narrow anthropocentric per-
spective the question rises whether that kind of integrative bioethics approach leads 
us to a threshold of a new epoch where, in Löwiths words, Kosmos is once more tak-
ing over the priority over Anthropos.
23 "In bioethical discourse the notion of sensibility describes emphasised delicasy towards environment. It 
is implying morally refl ected referring towards human existence and the existence of other living beings. It is 
containing enlightened aff ection towards those who are weak and unprotected, but it is also opening new horizons 
in ‘old’ notions of respect, love and sympathy. Bioethical sensibility appears as an important integral element of 
humanity with a high level of respect, fi nding again its place alongside cold rationality." (Ibid., p. 608). (translation 
M. S.)
24 For further research see: Ante Čović: "Pluralizam i pluriperspektivizam", Filozofska istraživanja 101 (1/2006), 
p. 7-12.
